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Economic literature provides mixed results about what really matters at 
corporate governance and the board room. Some research covering different 
countries suggests that size and ratio of board room matters. The purpose of 
this paper is to investigate the performance impact at the board level in the 
corporate governance of Japanese companies. We investigate the size as well 
as the ratio of outside directors and outside auditors and apply them to all 
Japanese manufacturing companies listing on the First Stock Exchange in 
Tokyo, a set of 821 companies.  
     To do this, we put Japanese companies into three groups: 1
st traditional 
companies (without outside directors), 2
nd new Japanese companies (which 
appointed outside directors) and 3
rd companies who decided to apply to the 
US-Style system. In our sample we found evidence that board size did not 
matter but we found correlation between the ratio of outside directors / 
outside auditors and the performance of the companies. Furthermore, 
traditional Japanese companies showed the weakest performance, US-style 
Japanese companies the strongest.  
    This result is highly important as it says that Japanese companies are 
better off having a high ratio of outside directors and outside auditors. In 
addition to this, Japanese companies might think about the advantages of 
introducing a US-style-system. At least in our research with only a few 
numbers of US-style companies, they outperformed the others. 
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The boards of large organization play an important role in the corporate 
governance (Fama and Jensen, 1983). It plays a key role in monitoring and 
controlling managers and can be described as a bridge between company 
management and shareholders (Dalton et al., 1999). Previous, the Japanese 
bank-based system is often times closely linked to the German system 
(Sakakibara, 1995; Dore, 1996, 2000; Yamamura and Streeck, 2003). 
Historically, both countries have been bank-dominated by strong 
stakeholder-orientation (Jackson and Moerke, 2005). However, in contrast to 
German system of co-determination, Japanese law does not require employee 
participation at the board level. Japanese boards traditionally have been 
comprised almost exclusively of managers who served their whole career in 
the same company (Milhaupt and West, 2004). In recent years, there are 
indicators that this system changed in Japan already after the bubble 
economy in the beginning of the 90
th.  
Despite past economic success, Japanese companies faced strong pressure 
to change their corporate governance system. Japan’s legal framework of 
corporate ownership changed (Egashira, 2001; Kanda, 2001; Wakasugi, 2004, 
Seki, 2005). The changes covered corporate law and other regulations as 
well as the role of the banks and the whole financial system (Jackson and 
Moerke, 2005). A new stock-swap system and a stock option plan was 
introduced. Furthermore, companies have to apply new market accounting 
standards (Bebenroth, 2003). Since April 2002 even US- style corporate 
governance system is possible for Japanese companies to choose. This was 
possible because of an amendment of the Commercial Code. Besides these 
legal changes, several attempts were made to introduce a corporate 
governance code. In 2001 a Japanese corporate governance code was 
published and in 2004 the “new principles of a corporate governance for 
stock listed companies” were released (Internet www.ecgi.org/codes). 
However, Japanese companies do not have to use British style of comply or 




This paper is one of several contemporaneous papers, studying 
performance impact at the board level in the corporate governance of 
Japanese companies as a country in depth study. We investigate on the one 
hand board size as a performance impact, on the other hand the outside ratio 
of directors and auditors to the performance. The structure of this paper is 
the following. In chapter 2 we discuss ownership concentration versus board 
size performance impact of corporate governance. A segmentation of 
Japanese companies as a very new approach will be done in chapter 3. At 
chapter 4 we bring our research model, chapter 5 is about data and variables 
and in chapter 6 we present our analysis. Chapter 7 highlights discussion and 
in chapter 8 we close our research with a conclusion. 
 
2. Ownership concentration versus board size 
In the literature there is substantial evidence that a variation in country level 
rules, like the corporate governance system influences the capital market 
strength. A line of country comparison research by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishney provides evidence that corporate governance 
does matter. This evidence is based on several cross country studies (La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). Countries with stronger legal 
protection of minority shareholders have larger security markets, higher 
value for minority shareholder and less concentrated share ownership. 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) find out that changes in the legal 
protection of minority shareholders can affect the value of control rights. 
On the one hand, there are studies investigating about ownership 
concentration. On the other hand, some studies investigate about 
characteristics of the board room in regard to the corporate governance. 
Many studies in the field of ownership concentration emphasize on agency 
costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) in relation to social context where 
ownership concentration has been used to measure ties to the investors 
(Gerlach, 1992). Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) researched about ownership 
structure and firm profitability of Japanese companies. They found a 




performance. Ownership was measured by three categories, the largest five 
blockholders, nonfinancial companies (Keiretsu) and financial companies. In 
all three cases they found correlation for performance. In the first case 
looking at five biggest shareholder, correlation was significant positive. 
When keireitsu or banks were concentrated owner, correlation was negative. 
However, data of their study was taken from 1986-1991. Especially this time 
period is difficult to analyse as it was at the end of the Japanese bubble 
economy. There is much more limited evidence at a single country level that 
variations of corporate governance practices lead to a performance impact. 
Several papers analyzed the corporate governance and the performance in 
single country approaches apart from Japan, for example, Black 2001 about 
Russian firms and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003 about US firms.  
Apart from ownership concentration there is much more limited research 
about features of board characteristics. There are only few studies which 
provide statistical evidence of significant impact of performance in 
corporate governance in regard to the board structure. The results found are 
for example in Millstain and MacAvoy (1998) as well as in Bhagat and 
Black (2002). Their research is about the relationship between firm value 
and the board characteristics. Bhagat, Carey and Elson (1999) investigate the 
relationship between firm performance and outside directors. A new way of 
research was introduced by Gompers, Ishii, Metrick (2003) who linked firm 
market performance to a corporate governance index based on takeover 
defenses.  
     There is some evidence that investors in emerging markets are sensitive 
for corporate governance. When companies in emerging markets adapt a 
corporate governance system what investors appreciate, it is secure for them 
to invest, the companies market value increases. Black (2001) reports a 
powerful correlation between corporate governance and performance in 
emerging markets. According to his study about Russian firms, a worst-to-




70.000% (what means a 700-fold)
3. Japan is not an emerging market, 
however, a strength of our in-depth study of corporate governance, compared 
to a multi-country study, is the strong data availability, which let us use a 
much more complete set of dependant and control variables. 
 
3. Dividing three styles: Japanese – JUS - US  
     On April 2002 through an amendment of the Japanese Commercial Code 
the corporate governance system was strengthened. Since then, Japanese 
companies are given choice in terms of the governance system. Companies 
can stay with the old traditional corporate auditor system or they may 
change to US-style auditor system if their size allows them to do so. In this 
case three committees have to be established, for audit, for remuneration, 
and for nomination. On each of the committees the majority of the directors 
have to be from outside. The three committee governance system functions 
in the new law. In this regard, responsibilities of the board members for 
business decisions become clearer and accountability increases. In many 
countries where comply or explain rules exist, there is hope that the market 
will punish non complying companies. For the Japanese case, that would 
mean that companies who continued with their traditional system of not 
having any committees for remuneration and nomination they might come 
into the need for explaining to investors the reasons. Seki reports that at 
June 2004 some 43 companies decided to adopt the new system. Our sample 
only covers manufacturing firms listed on the first section of the Tokyo 
stock exchange so that we have only 24 companies for fiscal year 2003 and 
29 for the fiscal year of 2004 who changed to US-style board system. It is to 
say that this is a dramatic and fundamental change from the traditional old 
system. 
     Somehow more or less in the middle to the traditional Japanese style and 
the new US-style board system there is a hybrid model what offers some 
                                                           
3 Black’s sample, however, is very small, consists only out of 21 firms. Furthermore, he 




advantages of the American approach even if it is still Japanese company 
system. These companies different from the traditional ones have outside 
directors. Furthermore, there exists a clear trend in Japanese companies 
toward the separation between the members of the board and the executive 
officers at the board. These directors are responsible for divisional operation. 
They receive the new title of “shikko-yakuin.” Sony was one of the first 
companies who introduced an executive officer system with shikko-yakuin to 
separate monitoring board from operational functional board (Seki, 2005). 
Soon after, Sony, turned in to US-style system with nomination committees. 
In 2004, 678 companies listed on the First Section (some 43.5%) appointed 
at least one executive officer. In our research we describe this system as half 
Japanese half US-style, in the following called JUS-style system (Japanese 
US-style). In our empirical research we investigate about the ratio of outside 
directors and the performance of the companies. In the fiscal years 2003, 
from our investigated 821 companies there were 535 traditional Japanese 
companies. We found 262 JUS-style companies and 24 US-style companies. 
This tendency changed in fiscal year 2004 from traditional companies to JUS 
style and US-style companies. From again 821 companies in fiscal year 2004 
we found only 507 traditional companies (minus 28) and an increase of JUS 
companies of 23 to 285 as well as an increase of US style companies of 5 to 
29 companies (table board structure variables).  
 
 
4. Research Model 
    This study deals about board room in Japanese companies and is very new 
in its kind. We divide Japanese companies into three blocks. First are 
companies who maintain with the traditional Japanese style board system 
without any outside directors. Second group contains Japanese companies 
who introduced outside directors but remained to the auditor system. Third 
group exists of Japanese companies who completely changed their board to 
US- style system which introduced outside directors but no conventional 




Iinkai to sechi geisha). In this regard, we investigate about board size and 
ratio of outside directors /auditors in comparison to the performance. We 





A bulk of literature determines the Board size as an important factor of 
effective corporate governance (Jensen, 1993; Dalten et al., 1999; Bonn et 
al., 2004). There is a clear sign that smaller board size is preferable to have 
better performance.       
     Only minor studies find a positive correlation between board size and 
firm value (Ferris et al., 2003). According to resource dependence theory, 
larger boards have higher level of performance as they have better ability of 
securing critical resources. Furthermore, large boards may be able to create 
links to other institutions more easily than smaller boards (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Goodstein et al., 1994). Pfeffer found that the effective external linkage 
increases with board size. Bigger board sizes insure normally an increased 
pool of expertise.  
     On the other side, there are many studies showing negative performance 
when having a bigger board size (especially for small firms: Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, Wells 1998). According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), their 
research shows that large boards are less cohesive because too many voices 
are hard to transform into one strategic line. It is hard to take decisions and 
they are more difficult to coordinate. If a board is large, the ability of 
initiating strategic changes might be low (Goodstein 1994). Some 
researchers recommend board size at a best level of 10 members (Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992; Bonn et al., 2004). 
Historically, Japanese boards were very large in size (Kiel and Nicholson, 
2003). In the literature it is reported that some firms have had over 60 
directors sitting in the boards (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Dalton and Kesner 




companies is declining. Even if the numbers from other researcher seem not 
to be in line. Abbeglen reported many years ago about board sizes of 60 
directors and more. Yoshikawa comes with more recent results to a range 
between 20 and 30 directors. Miwa/Ramseyer too report numbers in this 
range for company data in the early years of 2000. In any case the number of 
directors seems to decline. Since JUS-companies are regarded as a new style 
and US-style system even more timly we suggest that traditional Japanese 
companies have bigger board sizes. Therefore, our first hypotheses is:  
 
1.a) Traditional Japanese board system companies have the biggest board 
size, JUS are in the middle and US-style boards have the smallest 
number of directors.  
 
Ratio of outside directors and outside auditors 
Naturally, the board of directors is composed not only of inside but also of 
outside directors. By amendment of the Commercial Code in 2002 the first 
definition of an “outside director” was established. An outside director is 
defined as a person who has not been director, officer or employee of the 
same company or its subsidiaries. Furthermore, this person does not 
executive the business of the company. However, neither a clear requirement 
nor independence of an outside director is clearly specified (Seki, 2005). 
There is already some research done about board composition including 
outside directors (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Bonn et al., 2004).  
Japan is clearly considered to have insider dominated boards (Charkham, 
1994). Studies have shown only to a small extend mixed results in what 
proportion is best for monitoring a company most effective (Baysinger et al., 
1991; Chaganti et al., 1985). Some first studies in this field support the 
hypothesis that inside directors are less effective than boards with more 
outside directors. Some researcher suggest; therefore, that an increase of 
outside directors makes the board become more effective in managerial 
performance (Fama, 1980; Bonn et al. 2004). We want to test this hypothesis 




523 companies from TSE First Section (35% of all listed companies) 
appointed at least one outside director (Seki, 2005). As traditional 
companies do not have any outside directors, this argument is to apply to 
two different Japanese boards, to the US-style board companies as well as to 
JUS system companies with outside directors. We suppose that US style 
system companies have a higher ratio of outside directors as they have 
majority of outside directors in their committees. Our hypothesis therefore 
is: 
 
1.b) US-style boards have higher outside director ratio than JUS style 
Japanese companies. 
 
As a next step regression analysis will be accomplished. Performance will be 
measured by Tobin’s Q for fiscal year 2004. For this we measure the 
performance of our companies whom we divided into three groups. 
 
With a regression analysis we measure performance to outside director ratio: 
2.a) Small board size leads to higher performance.  
 
In the next regression analysis, we measure ratio of outside director / auditor 
2.b) High outside director /auditor ratio leads to higher performance.  
 
In the final ANOVA analysis we measure performance to our three groups: 
3.) Traditional Japanese board system companies have the weakest 
performance, JUS are in the middle and US-style board companies have 
the highest performance. 
 
 
5. Data and Variables 
For this study, several sources of data were necessary. Financial Data were 




structure were collected from printed version of Yakuin Shikoho (Board of 
Director Handbook). 
     Our sample consists of 821 companies. All of these companies are from 
manufacturing sector to eliminate industry-level fixed effects. The sample 
consists of Japanese First Stock Exchange listed companies, where we found 
834. For 13 companies we could not find data so that we filtered our sample 
finally to 821 companies for the fiscal year 2003 and 2004. 
 
Board structure variables as independent variables 
We use board structure as independent variables. Board structure includes 
the numbers of inside and outside directors /auditors, we come up also with 
the ratio of both groups. In our study we focus on the board size as well as 
the ratio of outside directors /outside auditors. Outside directors are defined 
as such directors who are not former employees of the firm. The ratio of 
outside directors /auditors was measured as outsiders to the total number of 
directors /auditors. We place a dummy variable for the traditional Japanese 
board system (without any outside director /auditor), for JUS-style 
companies (who appointed at least one outside director) and for US-style 
adopted companies.  
 
Dependent variables and control variables  
There are many ways of measuring the performance of companies. Better 
governed companies could be more profitable, or they could pay higher 
dividends for a given level of profits, or investors could just value same 
dividends (or earnings) to a higher level. Many other studies connected to 
Japan and related to performance use ROA (Prowse, 1992; Nitta 2000; 
Suzuki and Sho, 2000; Yoshikawa and Phan, 2003). As we divide Japanese 
companies into three groups with different assets, we measure the firm 
performance by Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. Tobin’s Q was 
measured as Share Price * Outstanding Shares + Debts (long- and short 




      We have to consider a time lag; therefore, we took the fiscal year of 
2004 for Tobin’s Q and the fiscal year of 2003 for our independent variables. 
As control variable we use five variables. LN(Total Assets), LN (Turnover), 
fixed asset ratio, growth rate of return (for the last 5 years) and growth rate 
of cash flow (also for the last 5 years).  
For controlling the firm size, we follow the common practice of using LN 
(assets) as Durnev and Kim (2003). In line with prior research the 
coefficient on LN (assets) should be negative. These variables can be in 
contrast to each other. For example, some companies might focus on high 
turnover, others might focus on growth rate of return or on a high market 
share. All the financial data was retrieved from NEEDS Databank. 
 
 
6. Analysis  
We did 3 Types of Analyses. First, we accomplished a descriptive analysis. 
After that several correlation analyses were done. Finally, third, regression 
and ANOVA analyses were necessary to investigate about statistical 
significance of our variables. 
    Our descriptive Analyses contain 1. Board structure variables, 2. Control 
variables and 3. Performance variables (See attachments table 1 and 2).  
First, we tested two questions in a descriptive attempt. We divided three 
groups out of traditional Japanese companies, JUS-companies with outside 
directors and as a third group US-style companies. We tested the board size 
as e.g. Miwa and Ramseyer did. Furthermore we subtracted auditors from the 
board so that we came to the real director board size. The number of 
directors is smaller than any other study about board size of Japanese 
companies has shown yet. From the table above, we find evidence that the 
average board size at all investigated Japanese companies is 10.16 in the 
fiscal year 2003 and decreased to 9.81 directors in the fiscal year 2004. If 
auditors too are included into the board size, the director number increases 




Looking at the number of the board sizes in 2003, traditional Japanese 
companies have 13.71, JUS companies have 14.61 and US-style companies 
have 9.25. In fiscal year 2004 quite similar results appear. Again, traditional 
Japanese companies’ board sizes are with 13.48 smaller than JUS companies 
with 14.15 directors. US-style companies once more have the smallest size 
with only 8.97 directors. Our hypothesis 1.a failed. 
    When dividing the number of outside directors into three groups, it is 
visible that JUS-companies in 2003 have on average 1.57 outside directors 
and US-style companies on average 3.71. For the year 2004 the numbers 
change only to a small amount. JUS companies have 1.69 outside directors 
on average and US-style companies 3.52. In 2003, JUS style companies have 
an outside ratio of 0.17 in contrast to US-style companies who have an 
outside ratio of 0.42. In 2004, JUS companies have an outside director ratio 
of 0.19 and US style companies of 0.41. Our hypothesis 1.b is supported. 
 In addition to this we looked at the number of outside auditors. For 2003 
it is measured as 1.37 for traditional Japanese style companies and 1.65 for 
JUS companies. In 2004 this number changes again only to a small amount. 
For traditional Japanese style companies to 1.46 and for JUS companies to 
1.67. Interestingly, the gap of outside auditors between traditional and JUS 
companies is only small.  
 Tobin’s Q for all companies in 2003 is in average 1.23 (see attachment, 
table 4). As our hypothesis suggested, traditional Japanese style companies 
have the lowest value with 1.18, JUS companies are in the middle with 1.30 
and US style companies have the highest score with 1.61 (Table 4, Tobin’s Q 
in attachment). 
 Next we undertook a pearson correlation analysis for 2003 and 2004 (see 
attachment pearson correlation, table 6 and 7).  
There is a strong correlation between the ratio of outside directors and 
Tobin’s Q for both years with 1% significance. The ratio of outside auditors 
to Tobin’s Q is significant for two years on 1% and 10% level. 
     In the regression part for Tobin’s Q in the year 2004 we see that our R
2’ 




explained by 12.6%.  As another figure, F=10.120, P=0.000 what means that 
our model is as a whole significant (see attached regression model, table 8-
10). 
    According to ANOVA analysis, traditional Japanese companies have the 
weakest, JUS-companies are in the middle and US-Style companies have the 
strongest performance measured by Tobin’s Q. The significance level of 
differences for each group is under 1% what means highly significant 
(Attachment ANOVA, table 11). Results of our hypothesis are as follows:  
 
Descriptive analysis 
1.a) The board size of JUS companies is not smaller than the size of 
traditional Japanese companies. 





2.a) Smaller board size does not lead to a better performance. 
 





3) Traditional Japanese companies show the weakest performance. JUS are 










7. Discussion  
First, it is for us a surprise that the board member size in our study is much 
lower than described in almost all other previous studies about Japanese 
board rooms. The board size has far changed what was reported earlier by 
Abegglen who came to board size numbers like 60 members for Japanese 
boards (1985). Also Miwa and Ramseyer found sizes of more than 20 
members on average in the early years of 2000 (Miwa and Ramseyer 2005).     
     Unexpectedly, the board size number in our research covering the fiscal 
year 2003 and 2004 is very low, just below 14 members. In fact, the number 
of the board size according to the Yakuin Shikiho includes the numbers of 
auditors too. It is to assume that previous studies included all persons 
written in the Yakuin Shikiho even there are the auditors included. Therefore, 
for receiving another independent variable we subtracted the number of 
auditors from the whole board size and came then to our real board size. The 
board size was in 2003 on average was at 10.16 and decreased again for 
2004 to only 9.81 directors on an average Japanese board.  
    It is to mention that in Japan the power of directors might differ from the 
board size. It means to be on a board does not meant automatically to have 
any power. This might be quite different to boards in other countries. In 
Japan normally not the whole board for itself takes decisions but some 
groups from upper level in the board. This upper level is comprised of 
“Representative Directors” which can exist of Managing Director, Senior 
Managing Director, Executive-Vice-Director, Vice Chairman and Chairman. 
Future research could be done about representative directors, in Japanese 
language called “Jomu-kai.” All the other officers in the board might not 
influence enough the actual decision making process. 
Second, it is interesting for us to see that the ratio of outside directors and 
the ratio of outside auditors have impact on the performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q.  
    This study has also some shortcomings. We measured the performance 




if the results will be robust using other measure for performance or other 
years. 
  
8. Conclusion  
The board room plays an outstanding role in the corporate governance 
research since Fama and Jensen (1983). There are several studies from 
different countries about corporate governance and board room impact with 
mixed results. Their research focused mainly about the size of the board 
room and their performance. The theory goes like this: the smaller the board 
room, the better the performance of the company.  
     We investigate the size as well as the ratio of outside directors and 
outside auditors and apply them to all Japanese manufacturing companies 
which are listed on the First Stock Exchange in Tokyo, a set of 821 
companies. We obtained newest data for two years, 2003 and 2004. Japanese 
companies were taken into three groups. The 1
st group contains traditional 
companies (without outside directors). A second group is of new-style 
Japanese companies which appointed at least one outside directors (called 
JUS companies). A third group only small in number is of companies who 
decided to apply themselves to the US-Style company system. Our 
performance was measured by Tobin’s Q for the year 2004. We found that 
the board size did not matter. There was no performance gap between bigger 
board size and smaller board size companies. However, the ratio of outside 
directors and outside auditors mattered. Companies having a high ratio of 
outside directors as well as a high ratio of outside auditors outperformed the 
other companies. Furthermore, traditional Japanese companies showed the 
weakest performance, US-style Japanese companies showed the strongest 
performance. Companies who appointed at least one outside directors (called 
JUS-companies) were found somewhere in the middle.  
     Our results are important for academics and for practice too. If these first 
results can be verified in future research, it would mean that Japanese 
companies are advised to introduce more outside directors into their boards 




                 References 
 
•  Abegglen , J. and Stalk, G.(1985)  Kaisha: The Japanese Corporation. 
New York: Basic Books. 
•  Aoki, H. ( 2002)  Impacts of firm performance and corporate 
governance on board reform:  The determinants of introducing 
executive officer system, Nihon Keiei Gakkaishi(Journal of Business 
Management),  Vol.8, pp.3-14 (in Japanese).   
•  Baysinger, B., Kosnik, R. and Turk, T.A. (1991)  Effects of board and 
ownership structure on corporate R&D strategy,  Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol.34, pp.205-214. 
•  Bebenroth, R. (2003)  Corporate Governance in Japan: Governmental 
Regulation, Journal of Osaka University of Economics, January 2004, 
Vol.54, No.5, pp.429-438. 
•  Bhagat, S. and Black. B. (2002)  The Non-Correlation between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, Journal of 
Corporation Law, Vol.27. pp.231-273. 
•  Bhagat, S., Carey, D. and Elson, C. (1999) Director Ownership, 
Corporate Performance, and Management Turnover, Business Lawyer, 
Vol.54, no page 
•  Black, B. (2001)  The Corporate Governance Behavior and Market 
Value of Russian Firms,  Emerging Markets Review, Vol.12, pp.89-
108.  
•  Bonn, I, Yoshikawa, T. and Phan, P. (2004)   Effects of Board 
Structure on Firm Performance: A Comparison between Japan and 
Australia, Asian Business Management, Vol.3, pp.105-125. 
•  Chaganti, R., Mahajan, V. and Sharma, S. (1985)  Corporate board 
size, composition and corporate failures in retailing industry. Journal 
of Management Studies, Vol.22, pp.400-417.  
•  Charkham, J.(1994)  Keeping Good Company:  A study of Corporate 




•  Dalton, D., Daily, C., Johnson, J., and Ellstrand, A. (1999) Number of 
directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis, Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol.42, pp.674-686. 
•  Dalton, D. and Kesner, I. (1987) Composition and CEO duality in 
board of directors:  An international perspective, Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol.18, No.3,  pp.33-42. 
•  Dore, R. (2000)  Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism―
Japan and Germany versus the Anglo-Saxons, Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press. 
•  Durnev, A. and Kim, E. (2003) To Steal of Not to Steal: Firm 
Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation, Social Science 
Research Network, Working Paper, in internet: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=318719 
•  Egashira, K. (2001) Yugenkaisha Ho (The Laws of Stock 
Corporations and Limited Liability Companies, Tokyo), Yuhikaku.  
•  Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S. and Wells, M. (1998)  Larger Board Size 
and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol.48, pp.35-54. 
•  Fama, E. (1980)  Agency problems and the theory of the firm, Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol.88, pp.288-307. 
•  Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1983)  Separation of ownership and control, 
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.26, pp.301-325. 
•  Ferris, S., Jagannathan, M., and Pritchard, A. (2003)  Too Busy to 
Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board 
Appointments, in: http://ssrn.com/abstract=167288. 
•  Gedajlovic, E. and Daniel, S.(2002)  Ownership Structure and Firm 
Performance, Academy of Management Journal, Vol.45, No.2, pp.565-
575. 
•  Gompers, P., Ishii, J. and Metrick, A. (2003) Corporate Governance 
and Equity Prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 107-155. 
•  Gerlach, M., (1992)  Alliance capitalism: The social organization of 




•  Goodstein, J. Gautam, K. and Boeker, W. (1994) The Effects of Board 
Size and Diversity on Strategic Change, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol.15, pp.241-250. 
•  Jackson, G. /Moerke, A. (2005) Continuity and Change in Corporate 
Governance: comparing Germany and Japan, Corporate Governance 
Journal, Vol. 13, pp.351-361. 
•  Jensen, M. (1993) The modern industry revolution, exit, and the 
failure of internal control system, Journal of Finance, Vol.48, pp.831-
880. 
•  Kanda, H. (2001) Kaisha ho (Company Law), Tokyo：Kobundo. 
•  Kiel, G.C. and Nicholson, G.J. (2003)  Board composition and 
corporate performance: how the Australian experience informs 
contrasting theories of corporate governance, CorporateGovernance: 
An International Review, Vol.11, pp.189-205. 
•  Kikuchi, M. (1999) Kigyo Kachi Hyoka Kakumei (Revolution in 
corporate valuation). Toyo Keizai Shimposha. 
•  Learmont, S. (2002) Corporate Governance. What can be Learned 
from Japan? Oxford University Press. 
•  La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.and Vishney, R. (1997)  
Legal Determinants of External Finance, Journal of Finance, 
Vol.54,pp. 471-517.  
•  La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.and Vishney, R. (1998) 
Law and Finace, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.106, pp.1113-
1155. 
•  La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. (1999)  Corporate 
Ownership around the world, Journal of Finance, Vol.54, pp.471-517. 
•  La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.and Vishney, R. (2000)  
Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World, Journal of 
Finance, Vol.55, pp.1-33. 
•  Lipton, M. and Lorsch, J.W. (1992) A modest proposal for improved 
corporate governance, Business Lawye, Vol.48, pp.59-77. 




•  Milhaupt, C.J. and West, M.D. (2004)  Economic Organizations and 
Corporate Governance in Japan: The Impact of Formal and 
Informal Rules, Oxford Press. 
•  Millstain, I. and MacAvoy, P. (1998)  Active Board of Directors and 
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, Columbia Law 
Review, Vol.98, pp.1283-1321. 
•  Nitta, K. (2000) Cross-shareholdings and corporate performance, 
Security Analysts Journal, Vol.38, pp.72-93 (in Japanese). 
•  Pfeffer, (1972)  Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of 
Directors：The Organization and its Environment, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Vol.17, pp.218-228. 
•  Prowse, S. D. （1992）The structure of corporate ownership in Japan, 
Journal of Finance, Vol.47, pp.1121-1140.  
•  Sakakibara, E. (1995) Nichi o be keizai shakai shisutemu (Economic 
and Social Systems in Japan, America and Europe), (ed). Tokyo: Toyo 
Keizai Shinbunsha.  
•  Seki, T. (2005)  Legal Reform and Shareholder Activism by 
Institutional Investors in Japan, Corporate Governance Journal, 
Vol.13, No.3, May2005, pp.377-385. 
•  Sheard, P. (1997) Mein Banku Shihonshugi no Kiki (Crisis of the Main 
Bank Capitalism), Tokyo：Toyo Keizai Shimposha. 
•  Shin, H. and Stulz, R. (2000)  Firm Value, Risk, and Growth 
Opportunities, National Bureau of Economic Research, Social Science 
Research Network, Working Paper No.W7808, in internet under: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=234344. 
•  Schleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997)  A Survey of Corporate 
Governance, Journal of Finance, Vol.52, pp.737-783. 
•  Suzuki, M. and Sho, H. (2000)  Number of  Board Members and 
Business Performance (in Japanese), Security Analysts Journal,Vol.38, 
No.9, pp.47-65. 
•  Wakasugi, T. (2004)  K`abunushi ga mezameru hi (The Day when 




•  Yamamura, K. /Streeck, W. (2003) The End of Diversity? Prospects of 
German and Japanese Capitalism (eds). Ihaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
•  Yoshikawa, T. and Phan, P.H. (2001) Alternative corporate 
governance systems in Japanese firms: Implications for a shift to 
stockholder-centered corporate governance. Asia pacific Journal of 
Management, Vol.18, pp.183-205. 
•  Yoshikawa, T. and Phan P.H. (2003) The Performance Implications of 
Ownership-driven Governance Reform, European management 




























Table1   Board Structure Variables 
 
2003 2004   
ALL JPN JUS  US  ALL JPN JUS US 
No. of  Directors and 
Auditors 
13.87 13.71 14.61 9.25 13.55 13.48  14.15  8.97 
No. of  Directors  10.16 9.91 10.77 9.25 9.81 9.61 10.25  8.97 
No. of  Outside Directors  .61 0    1.57 3.71    .71  0  1.69  3.52 
Ratio of  Outside 
Directors 
.07 0  .17 .42  .08  0    .19    .41 
No. of Auditors  3.71 3.81 3.85 0 3.74  3.87  3.91  0 
No. of  Outside Auditors   1.42  1.37   1.65 0  1.48  1.46  1.67  0 
Ratio of  Outside 
Auditors 
   .38    .36     .42 0   .39    .38   .43  0 
No. of  Companies  821 535 262 24  821 507 285 29 
Numbers through own results 
 
Table2   Detailed Board Structure in 2003 
報告書
13.7140 9.91 .00 .0000 3.81 1.37 .3591
535 535 535 535 535 535 535
6.00 3 0 .00 3 0 .00
42.00 36 0 .00 7 4 1.00
4.6747 4.42 .00 .0000 .60 .84 .2159
14.6145 10.77 1.57 .1668 3.85 1.65 .4290
262 262 262 262 262 262 262
7.00 4 1 .03 3 0 .00
41.00 36 7 1.00 6 5 1.00
5.1603 4.96 .96 .1150 .56 .89 .2199
9.2500 9.25 3.71 .4172 .00 .00
24 24 24 24 24 24
5.00 5 2 .21 0 0
16.00 16 8 .67 0 0
2.8476 2.85 1.37 .1358 .00 .00
13.8709 10.16 .61 6.541E-02 3.71 1.42 .3821
821 821 821 821 821 821 797
5.00 3 0 .00 0 0 .00
42.00 36 8 1.00 7 5 1.00






















































Table3   Detailed Board Structure in 2004 
報告書
13.4773 9.61 .00 .0000 3.87 1.46 .3757
507 507 507 507 507 507 507
7.00 4 0 .00 3 0 .00
43.00 37 0 .00 7 4 1.00
4.5298 4.29 .00 .0000 .61 .90 .2261
14.1509 10.25 1.69 .1860 3.91 1.67 .4278
285 285 285 285 285 285 285
6.00 3 1 .03 3 0 .00
35.00 31 8 1.00 6 4 1.00
4.6378 4.37 1.12 .1344 .63 .87 .2167
8.9655 8.97 3.52 .4122 .00 .00
29 29 29 29 29 29
5.00 5 1 .07 0 0
14.00 14 8 .75 0 0
2.4854 2.49 1.50 .1664 .00 .00
13.5518 9.81 .71 7.914E-02 3.74 1.48 .3944
821 821 821 821 821 821 792
5.00 3 0 .00 0 0 .00
43.00 37 8 1.00 7 4 1.00



















































Table4   Dependant variable (Performance, Tobin’s Q) 
 
2004 2005   
ALL JPN  JUS  US  ALL JPN  JUS  US 
Tobin’s Q  1.2307 1.1788 1.3030 1.6070 1.3027 1.2460 1.3558 1.7646
No. of  
Companies 













Table5   Control Variables 
 
2003 2004   
ALL JPN JUS US  ALL  JPN  JUS  US 
Total  Assets(in 
1000 Yen) 
227714  203547 237497 658653 237107 195996 276945 559311
Turnover (in 1000 
Yen) 
41125  37065  45950 79173 42545 36792 49887 70984
Fixed Asset Ratio  128.17  123.49 138.99 115.78 131.81 114.79 163.85 114.60
Growth Rate of 
Return (for 5 
years) 
8.46  8.16 9.09 8.76 9.48 10.47  7.17 14.39
Growth Rate of 
Cash Flow (for 5 
years) 
5.17 5.64  4.29  3.42  5.73 6.45 4.37 6.27 
 
 
Table6   Pearson Correlation in 2003 
相関係数
1.000 .797** .007 .012 .219** -.070* .064 .065 .070*
. .000 .853 .726 .000 .045 .074 .062 .045
815 795 815 815 815 815 786 815 813
.797** 1.000 .020 .032 .171** -.087* .069 .070* .099**
.000 . .575 .369 .000 .014 .055 .047 .005
795 800 800 800 800 800 771 799 798
.007 .020 1.000 .985** -.164** .399** -.007 .371** .407**
.853 .575 . .000 .000 .000 .847 .000 .000
815 800 821 821 821 821 792 820 819
.012 .032 .985** 1.000 -.101** .263** -.009 .368** .392**
.726 .369 .000 . .004 .000 .796 .000 .000
815 800 821 821 821 821 792 820 819
.219** .171** -.164** -.101** 1.000 -.377** .115** .040 -.050
.000 .000 .000 .004 . .000 .001 .247 .151
815 800 821 821 821 821 792 820 819
-.070* -.087* .399** .263** -.377** 1.000 .005 .131** .212**
.045 .014 .000 .000 .000 . .892 .000 .000
815 800 821 821 821 821 792 820 819
.064 .069 -.007 -.009 .115** .005 1.000 .032 .003
.074 .055 .847 .796 .001 .892 . .370 .941
786 771 792 792 792 792 792 791 790
.065 .070* .371** .368** .040 .131** .032 1.000 .544**
.062 .047 .000 .000 .247 .000 .370 . .000
815 799 820 820 820 820 791 820 818
.070* .099** .407** .392** -.050 .212** .003 .544** 1.000
.045 .005 .000 .000 .151 .000 .941 .000 .
























































相関係数は 1% 水準で有意 (両側) です。 **. 






Table7   Pearson Correlation in 2004 
相関係数
1.000 .797** -.011 .003 .196** -.070* .064 .049 .118**
. .000 .744 .930 .000 .045 .074 .163 .001
815 795 815 815 815 815 786 795 815
.797** 1.000 -.001 .018 .167** -.087* .069 .061 .129**
.000 . .979 .608 .000 .014 .055 .083 .000
795 800 800 800 800 800 771 800 800
-.011 -.001 1.000 .980** -.175** .441** -.018 .471** .337**
.744 .979 . .000 .000 .000 .607 .000 .000
815 800 821 821 821 821 792 800 821
.003 .018 .980** 1.000 -.108** .256** -.020 .458** .328**
.930 .608 .000 . .002 .000 .573 .000 .000
815 800 821 821 821 821 792 800 821
.196** .167** -.175** -.108** 1.000 -.369** .108** -.003 .010
.000 .000 .000 .002 . .000 .002 .942 .778
815 800 821 821 821 821 792 800 821
-.070* -.087* .441** .256** -.369** 1.000 .005 .225** .159**
.045 .014 .000 .000 .000 . .892 .000 .000
815 800 821 821 821 821 792 800 821
.064 .069 -.018 -.020 .108** .005 1.000 -.022 .050
.074 .055 .607 .573 .002 .892 . .546 .162
786 771 792 792 792 792 792 771 792
.049 .061 .471** .458** -.003 .225** -.022 1.000 .546**
.163 .083 .000 .000 .942 .000 .546 . .000
795 800 800 800 800 800 771 800 800
.118** .129** .337** .328** .010 .159** .050 .546** 1.000
.001 .000 .000 .000 .778 .000 .162 .000 .
























































相関係数は 1% 水準で有意 (両側) です。 **. 
相関係数は 5% 水準で有意 (両側) です。 *. 
 
Table8   Regression analysis for Total Companies 
係数a
.363 .234 1.550 .122
-5.109E-03 .005 -.044 -.972 .331
.567 .252 .089 2.254 .025
3.439E-02 .044 .036 .779 .436
.249 .110 .091 2.274 .023
1.753E-03 .036 .004 .049 .961
9.000E-02 .032 .198 2.852 .005
-1.915E-03 .000 -.204 -4.870 .000
2.825E-03 .001 .108 2.499 .013
5.214E-03 .002 .143 3.299 .001
(定数)
03Number of Director Size
03Ratio of OUTSIDE
Director






Growth Rate of Return2003










従属変数: Tobin's Q2004 a. 
 
R




 Table9   Regression analysis for Japanese-style companies  
係数a
.189 .267 .709 .479
-2.286E-03 .006 -.020 -.354 .723
4.437E-02 .051 .050 .876 .381
.130 .125 .050 1.041 .298
1.222E-02 .040 .027 .303 .762
9.195E-02 .035 .209 2.628 .009
-1.857E-03 .000 -.206 -4.090 .000
3.536E-03 .001 .139 2.590 .010
3.851E-03 .002 .110 2.083 .038
(定数)
03Number of Director Size






Growth Rate of Return2003










従属変数: Tobin's Q2004 a. 
 
R
2’=0.121, F=7.787, p=0.000. 
 
Table10   Regression analysis for JUS-Style companies  
係数a
.720 .491 1.468 .144
-1.510E-02 .010 -.132 -1.452 .149
.129 .525 .020 .246 .806
-1.018E-02 .089 -.009 -.114 .909
.530 .233 .171 2.273 .024
6.874E-03 .076 .014 .091 .928
7.636E-02 .069 .159 1.111 .268
-2.112E-03 .001 -.210 -2.728 .007
7.787E-04 .002 .029 .369 .713
7.601E-03 .003 .193 2.434 .016
(定数)
03Number of Director Size
03Ratio of OUTSIDE
Director






Growth Rate of Return2003










従属変数: Tobin's Q2004 a. 
 
R












-.1331* 4.500E-02 .003 -.2214 -4.47E-02
-.4858* .1227 .000 -.7266 -.2450
.1331* 4.500E-02 .003 4.474E-02 .2214
-.3527* .1255 .005 -.5991 -.1063
.4858* .1227 .000 .2450 .7266
.3527* .1255 .005 .1063 .5991
(J) 03Corporate
Governance STYLE：














差 (I-J) 標準誤差 有意確率 下限 上限
95% 信頼区間
平均の差は .05 で有意 *. 
 